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Compared to other developed countries, China is considered a latecomer in urban rail transit 
public and private partnership (PPP) because traditionally the country’s urban infrastructure is 
mainly provided and funded by the public sector through municipal revenues and government-
backed bank loans. Facing mounting municipal liabilities and huge demand for construction, 
China has been exploring many innovative financing modes for urban rail infrastructure, and 
PPP is one of the mostly practiced ones. This thesis studies the differences between China’s and 
other developed countries’ policy contexts for urban rail PPP adoption, with the goal to 
contribute to the discussion on what has been impeded China from fostering its current urban rail 
PPP projects. To shed light on possible answers, this thesis uses Japan as a case study and 
conducts a comparative analysis from two aspects: policy goals and policy outcomes formed by a 
combination of PPP policy and land value capture schemes related policies in these two 
countries. This thesis concludes that urban rail PPP is sensitive to policy environment provided 
by the government at both the city and national levels. Besides differences in land ownership and 
land transfer system, compared to Japan, China lacks an inadequate legal basis and an effective 
land-value capture scheme to effectively invite more stakeholders in the PPP projects to 
undertake the risks and share the benefits. These factors contribute to unfavorable policy 
contexts for urban rail PPP projects to fulfill their contract goals of long-term partnership, joint 
risk undertaking, and benefit sharing, and thus, the financing performance of China’s PPP 
projects is weakened. 
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1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has been used for rail development in China since the 
1990s. From a broad perspective, PPP can be simply defined as a formal relationship of 
collaboration based on a contract or concession agreement, between public entities on one side 
and private sectors on the other side, for delivering urban infrastructure or services traditionally 
provided by the public sector in an efficient way. China is a latecomer in urban rail PPP because 
the private sector has been traditionally prohibited from participating urban infrastructure 
projects. The current practice of financing urban rail projects through municipal fiscal revenues 
(partly from land concession fees) and government-backed bank loans is not only inadequate to 
meet the development demand, but also exacerbates the deep-seated problem of mounting 
municipal financial liabilities.  
To create an enabling environment for urban rail PPP, the Chinese central government 
made tentative efforts to introduce new policies to the existing institutional contexts. Chinese 
local governments, just as what they have done in the pilot phase of PPPs for general 
infrastructure projects in China (1983-1999), taking advantages of policies initiated by the 
Central government, designed different local regulations with an expectation to attract more 
urban rail PPP in to finance their metro projects (for example, Predetermined Land Reserve in 
Wuhan, R+P Model in Shenzhen, Beijing Line 4 PPP Model in Beijing, etc). Even though it is 
too early to judge whether these new PPP models will be truly financially viable over the long 
term in China, studying the difference between China’s and other developed countries’ policy 
contexts by comparing their urban rail PPP practices would provide a valuable experience for 




contribute to the discussion on what has been impeded China’s current urban rail PPP practices 
when comparing to other developed countries. 
 Japan’s urban rail PPP experience is selected for comparative study because it has been 
proven to be successful to finance urban rail development and reduce government’s financing 
pressure by sharing the benefits and risks with the private sector. By comparing with Japan’s 
policy contexts created for urban rail PPP projects, this thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
• What differences exist between China and Japan’s policy contexts for urban rail PPP 
practices?  
• Do these differences promote or inhibit China’s adoption of urban rail PPP? 
• If China’s policy context is not favorable for urban rail PPP practices, what can be 
learned from Japan’s experiences?  
1.2. Research Method 
At a broad level, this thesis is a comparative study of urban rail PPP schemes in two 
countries. To answer the research questions, this thesis uses Japan and its famous joint 
development model as a case study due to its successful and renowned PPP experiences 
worldwide. An illustration for our research framework is provided in Fig 1-1. Our literature 
review is comprised of four parts. The first part reviews PPP definitions to determine common 
goals shared by most PPP definitions. These goals are used to evaluate whether two countries 
have created enabling policy environments to fulfill these goals. Next, this thesis reviews current 
PPP studies in China and the country’s financing challenges for urban rails projects and other 
infrastructure projects to understand the development premises for urban PPP projects. Last, it 




PPP. As a comparative study, this thesis studies and compares China and Japan’s PPP policies 
and land value capture schemes related (LVC) policies due their importance in creating a 
favorable legal basis for urban rail PPP projects. A comparative analysis is conducted to compare 
policy goals and policy impacts to investigate what differences exist between China and Japan’s 
policy environments for urban rail PPP practices and whether they have promoted or impeded 
PPP practices. If Japan’s policy contexts are proven better at fulfilling the three broad goals 
defined in the PPP definition, the thesis will ask the question: what could China learn from 
Japan’s experiences?  
 
Fig. 1-1. Overview of research framework. 
 
1.3. Data 
This thesis mainly relies on publicly available data. Policies related to Japan’s case are 
primarily derived from Suzuki, Murakami, Hong and Tamayose’s (2015) Financing Transit-




as a major source for Japan’s policy studies and LVC case studies. Since Chinese policy analysis 
has been hotly debated after the number of PPP projects experienced a steady growth in China 
since 1990s, data is primarily derived from literature. Other data for Japanese policies analysis 
are primarily derived from Japanese government reports.  
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Part two of the thesis reviews PPP definitions, PPP practices and PPP financing 
challenges in China, and economic attributes for urban rails. Part three and part four studies PPP 
policies and LVC policies in two countries, which are necessary to create a favorable legal basis 
for urban rail PPP practices. To study the differences between policy contexts in Japan and 
China, part five conducts a comparative analysis from two directions: policy goals and policy 
















2. Literature Review 
2.1. PPP Definitions: Define Contract Goals 
There is no universally accepted, clear, legal definition for the concept of PPP because 
various agencies and jurisdictions define it differently for their own particular context. However, 
there is an agreement that many countries have promoted PPP to overcome the traditional 
drawbacks of public procurement: the lack of risk sharing mechanisms; and an overreliance on 
public funding (Wang et al., 2018). Therefore, as opposed to more traditional temporary contract 
arrangements, PPP is considered a long-term and innovative means to enable the public sector 
and the private sector to work together to develop new solutions to common problems (Hodge 
and Greve, 2011). 
Based on a broad perspective, PPP can be most simply defined as a formal collaboration 
based on a contract or concession agreement for delivering urban infrastructure or services in an 
efficient way (as purpose and function), through the synergetic cooperation between both public 
and private partners (as means and key features) (Cheng & Fang, 2011; Suzuki et al., 2015; 
Zhang, Gao, Feng, & Sun, 2015). In a PPP project, the contract will clarify the rights and 
obligations for both parties (Lu, Li, Wolfers, & Shen, 2017). Under such an arrangement, the 
partners will share the resources, risks and benefits of the project. Therefore, three common 
goals can be defined through the simplest definition of PPP: 
Goal 1: Long-term relationship 
Goal 2: Joint Risk Sharing 
Goal 3: Joint Benefit Sharing 
As a long-term contractual arrangement for the cooperation and coordination between 




organizational process throughout the whole development and operation cycle” (Zhang et al., 
2015). Therefore, governance issues of PPP are concerned with providing rules of good order at 
both the institutional (macro) level and the organizational (micro) level. However, this thesis has 
mainly considered questions related to macro-level policy contexts since organizational-level 
performances are easily shaped by the institutional-level context. Without an enabling 
institutional context, PPP practices are hard to fulfill as set in the contract.    
2.2. PPP Studies in China: Development Challenges 
 Over the past 40 years, PPP in China has gained large academic attention due to the 
extensive construction and investment taking place throughout the country’s cities. Research has 
shown that most existing literature focuses on analysis of risk allocations, institutional barriers 
and benefits and costs of urban rail transit (URT) PPPs (Chang, 2014).  
 De Jong et al. (2009) studied seven PPP projects in five Chinese metropolitan areas and 
discovered that the institutional framework of PPPs had not yet been established in China. The 
absence of legal safeguards could potentially hurt the interest of private sectors and, so, drove 
them away. Chan et al. (2014) reported that not all PPP projects in China have been successful 
and that numerous projects have failed because of inadequate risk management. Xu, Chan and 
Yeung (2010) established a synthetic evaluation model to determine if the risk allocation 
between the government and the private sector was equitable and analyzed the political risks 
when applying a PPP model in China. Chan, Lam, Chan, Cheung and Ke (2009) compared key 
drivers for adopting a PPP model in Hong Kong and China and found that the main motive was 
efficiency for the former and fundraising for the latter. 
 This thesis aims to add to the literature reviewing China’s institutional barriers to 




2.3. Financing Challenges for Urban Rail Development in China: Development Premises 
China’s demand for and investment of urban rail construction is at an unprecedentedly 
high level. During 2001-2005, China constructed 247 miles of urban rail and invested about $30 
billion dollars. By the end of 2017, total urban rail mileage under construction in China reached 
5,770 miles. According to China’s 13th national Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), investment in 
Chinese urban rail development is expected to exceed $320 billion dollars and construction 
mileage is expected to reach 7,700 miles by 2020. Currently, urban rail systems can be found in 
33 Chinese cities, with 22 other cities planning to build new ones.  
 Government funds have financed most of the metro developments in China to date. The 
main source of funding has been from public sales of development rights and land transfer fees 
from public to private ownership. On one hand, Chinese governments have not been allowed to 
transfer development rights to rail transit companies. Yet, in recent years, due to tightened 
requirements of farmland protection regulations, the cost of land acquisition and demolition and 
relocation has increased significantly. Land sales have often led to rapid land conversion of rural 
agricultural land into urban land without an adequate economic rational or planning (Suzuki et 
al, 2015.) Further, under China’s current land-leasing system, the government is unable to grant 
land-use rights to rail transit companies at zero or reduced cost. Nor does it allow private rail 
companies to pay land leases in installments. Under this arrangement, the government can fully 
capture transit premiums (Xue & Fang, 2017). 
 With such potential for huge investment in URT, various cities have been exploring 
innovative financing modes for these projects. However, it remains that Chinese urban rail 




government funds started falling for the first time in 14 years in 2015, it still constitutes more 
than half of all urban rail project funding of the year. 
 
Fig. 2-1. Comparison of funding source for URT systems in China, 2001-15  
(Sun, Chen, Cheng, Wang, & Ning, 2017). 
  
Local governments must provide additional substantial subsidies to cover the shortfall in 
the cost for metro systems construction and operation. As infrastructure investment continues to 
be associated with accumulated local debt, infrastructure financing sustainability has become of 
greater concern for the Chinese government. A strong need has grown for other innovative 
financing tools.  
2.4. Economic Attributes of Urban Rail Transit: Theoretical Foundation 
Liao (2016) defines four economic attributes and characteristics for urban rail transit, 




detail in this section due to its importance in understanding the economic nature of urban rail 
projects.1  
2.4.1. Quasi-public goods theory 
Urban rail is a quasi-public good because it has imperfect competition and incomplete 
exclusivity. For example, while the number of passengers on a metro service is under carrying 
capacity, metro fares stay at a publicly acceptable range, meaning all passengers can enjoy the 
ride. However, once the number of passengers exceeds the carrying capacity, rather than 
squeezing more bodies into the same amount of space, metro fares are used as a tool to form a 
level of competition among passengers. While this might keep use of the service comfortable, 
certain passengers must, by necessity, be excluded from using the metro service. Conversely, 
urban rail can be seen as a public good of incomplete exclusivity because one person’s ride does 
not affect the other. Consequently, once there are too many passengers, they affect each other not 
by preventing each other from using the service, but by impacting each other’s comfort and 
satisfaction when they all try to use the same space.  
2.4.2. Capital intensive and sunk costs 
Most investment for urban rail transport project is considered to be “sunk costs”. Unlike 
commercial enterprises, once invested, equipment for urban rail development is difficult to be 
repurposed for other uses. For instance, rail lines are difficult to change once completed, no 
matter how urban traffic has become distributed over time. Also, if a company wants to stop an 
operation, the residual value of many facilities is very limited. 
 
 
                                                






The externality of urban rail transit has three aspects which can increase the social and 
economic welfare of a city:  
• Producer to producer, i.e. the metro line location will affect land developers;  
• Producer to consumer, i.e. the metro project can encourage commercial 
development along the lines, providing convenience for local residents;  
• Consumer to consumer, i.e. automobile pollution will be reduced when residents 
take metros. 
2.4.4. Natural monopoly 
First, rail transit has asset specificity because it only exists in a certain area range to serve 
specific groups of people. Second, the efficiency of rail transit is based on its scale of rail 
network; the greater the coverage, the higher the efficiency. Third, because rail transit investment 
concentrates on the construction stage, once in operation, the average and marginal costs start 
failing due to profit generation by the fares, and gradually, scale effect will be formed.  
 Liao’s (2016) theoretical analysis of economic attributes of urban rail transit shows that 
even though rail transit projects have long construction periods, heavy investment needs, long 
payback periods, and weak profitability, they still have certain competitiveness, positive 
externalities and a natural monopoly, which are attractive for investors looking to finance urban 






3. PPP Policies 
3.1. Japan: National-Level Guidance  
Property prices peaked in the 1980s and the 1990s due to inflated demand for 
developable sites and speculative investments in Tokyo’s suburban areas. Rapid price increases 
were the major driving force for land owners to trade land at inflated prices and for public and 
private agencies to assemble small lots to generate capital gains. Later, the land price bubble 
crashed in 1991 due to inadequate credit assessment, leading to Japan’s decade-long economic 
stagnation (Sukuzi et al., 2015). 
 In the past two decades, Tokyo’s PPP was largely driven by the need for urban 
revitalization and spatial transformation of new town developments. The Private Finance 
Initiative Law was established in 1999 for the sake of bringing management skills from the 
private sector to improve public services. In 2001, an independent administrative institution 
system was established for PPPs and private finance initiatives (PFI). In 2003, local autonomy 
laws were amended to introduce the designated manager system, which enabled public facilities 
to be operated by private entities. In 2004, the preliminary report of the “Council for Regulatory 
Reforms and PPPs” revealed Japan’s market testing process was based on competitive tendering. 
In 2005, the “Medium-Term Outlook on Structural Reforms and Fiscal and Economic Policy” 
was adopted and specified the implementation of model projects for market testing. Legislative 
measures to realize market testing are also under consideration (Ministry of Economy of Japan, 
2005).  
3.2. China: Tentative Measures 
The 2000-2012 period was called the development phase for PPP projects in China. 




made by the Chinese central government. The “Amendment of the Constitution” which passed in 
2004 by the National People’s Congress, clearly specified that “the State protects the legal right 
and benefits of non-state-owned businesses, including individual business and private 
business…the State encourages, supports and directs the development of the non-state-owned 
economies” (Article 21), and “…private properties shall not be infringed” (Article 22).  
 Additionally, three administrative regulations were issued consecutively, which were 
seen as hallmark policies to further reform China’s infrastructure investment systems. The main 
purpose of these regulations was to enhance the efficiency of infrastructure provisions. The first 
regulation called for diversifying investment channels and attracts private funds through the 
market system to invest in infrastructure projects through PPPs.2 It also requires government 
administrative functions to be restructured to serve PPPs better. The second regulation, released 
in 2005, relaxes the market entry condition for private investors and offers support to private 
companies through financing and taxes.3 The third regulation, released in 2010, requires all 
levels of government to provide an equal investment opportunity for private investors.4  
 Focusing on the urban rail sector, in 2003, China promulgated a regulation specifying 
that “income of city authorities from the land increment along urban rail line should be mainly 
used for construction of urban rail transit project,”5 indicating land utilization was not included 
in the consideration.  
                                                
2 The first regulation is Decisions on the Reform of Investment Mechanisms (Guofa 2004).  
3 The second regulation is Opinions of Encouraging, Supporting and Introducing Private Economy Development 
(Guofa 2005). 
4 The third regulation is Directives of Promoting and Guiding Healthy Development of Private Investment (Guofa 
2010). 
5 This regulation is a notice from the General Office of State Council in 2003, called “Strengthening the 





The first changes in China’s urban rail finance system were initiated by the introduction 
of lower-level policies, which were quick-responsive, short-time oriented and flexible. In 1994, 
Guangzhou issued a regulation that “the comprehensive development within metro construction 
planning area belong to metro construction.” In 1997, Shanghai issued a regulation stating that 
“within the scope of land for metro construction determined by the urban planning, the rail 
transit company has the priority in engaging real estate, business and advertising and other 
business activities” (Sun et al., 2017). Shenzhen, Beijing and other Chinese cities issued similar 
regulations until the promulgation of the Chinese Property Law in 2007, which specified that the 
supply of land used for non-public welfare can only be realized through bidding, auction and 
allocation. Also, it specified that developable land alongside rail transit is classified as 
commercial land and should be acquired through tender, auction or other public bidding 
methods.    
3.2.1. Case Study: Beijing Line 4 PPP Model  
In the summer of 2001, Beijing won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics Games. A 
massive influx of visitors was expected, so the municipal government of Beijing moved quickly 
to the expansion of metro system. In order to explore new funding sources and use more PPPs to 
reduce the level of public investment in the metro system, the government developed Beijing 
MTR Corporation Limited (BMTRC) by a concession with Hong Kong MTR. BMTRC is a joint 
venture company comprised of three shareholders. Because the Chinese laws requires Chinese 
investors to hold at least 51% of the joint venture company, the Beijing Capital Group holds 49% 
of BMTRC shares, BIIC (another Chinese organization) holds 2%, and the remaining 49% is 





Figure 3-1. Joint venture structure in Beijing Line 4 project (Wang, 2005). 
 
In 2006, BMTRC implemented the first Chinese URT PPPs project, Beijing Line 4, a 29 
km-long metro line built at an estimated cost of USD$2.43 billion. The total investment 
consisted of two parts: Infrastructure, which accounted for two-thirds of the total investment and 
was financed by the public; and rolling stocks, which was financed, constructed and operated by 
BMTRC. After 30 years of operation, BMTRC is required to transfer ownership to the 
government at no additional cost. The contract also provided an exit option for BMTRC. If 
BMTRC loses money and exits due to poor management, the public will acquire rolling stocks at 
a discounted price. If the loss is due to a policy change by the public entity, for example, a low 
flat rate, the government is required to compensate BMTRC. 
According to the contract, the private sector could receive all operational revenues from 




30% of which is equity from the private sector and 70% which are loans from Chinese banks; 
Second, the cost of an annual rental fee for infrastructure built by the government; Third, 
corporate taxes paid to the public; Fourth, operational costs and capital improvement.  
The contract also establishes a mechanism to determine subsidy and revenue sharing 
based on shadow price and shadow patronage. The shadow price is a technique used to isolated 
the private partner from possible social policies of the government. In Beijing Line 4’s case, it 
establishes guaranteed revenue per passenger which is unrelated to actual fares. If the actual fare 
is lower than the shadow price, the public must compensate the BMTRC with the difference. If it 
is higher than the shadow price, the extra profits are to be divided among the public and the 
private partners, 70/30. 
Shadow patronage is used to compensate the private sector against risk of lower ridership 
than expected. In 2007, the government decided to promote metro transportation to combat 
growing urban congestion. It reduced the fares to a flat rate of two yuan. Because passengers 
usually took more than one line each trip, the actual fare for Beijing Line 4 was 1.04 yuan in 
2010. With the shadow price of 4 yuan, the government needed to subsidize 2.96 yuan per 
passenger per trip to the private sector (Chang, 2013). The estimated trips also went beyond both 
the public and private estimation. Shadow revenue is defined as: 
shadow revenue = shadow price x shadow patronage 
 
 The public sector believed they had over-subsidized BMTRC. Because the flat fare rate 
change was not reflected in the 2006 original contract, the public sector required a modification 
of the contract. In this process, Hong Kong MTR was in no position to refuse as it was not a 
major shareholder in the joint venture company (51% was held by public entities). Table 7-1 




the public would start to share revenue when actual patronage reached 100% of shadow level 
rather than 120%. If actual patronage was between 100% and 110%, the public could obtain half 
of the revenue. If it exceeded 110%, the public could receive 60% (Chang, 2013). Thus, the 
modified contract illustrates that there were risks for urban rail PPPs projects in China due to the 
absence of adequate laws (Chang, 2013). 
Table 3-1 Summary of public subsidy and revenue sharing scheme: original and revised.  
 
 








4. Land Value Capture Schemes Related Policies 
4.1. Japan: Land Readjustment Policy Urban Redevelopment Law 
Focusing on PPPs for urban rail projects, policies that enable LVC schemes, such as land 
readjustment and urban redevelopment, have played a significant role for private urban rail 
developers in the collection of lands for urban rail development in Japan. Under the “Land 
Readjustment Policy,” the planning agency will firstly review the location of the future railway 
station, then it will let landowners in suburban areas organize a cooperative body to consolidate 
irregularly shaped agricultural parcels, and return smaller but fully serviced, regularly shaped 
residential and commercial parcels with higher property value to the original landowners (Suzuki 
et al., 2015). Such schemes effectively invite more stakeholders into the PPP to jointly undertake 
the risks and share the benefits. This policy usually works together with the national 
government’s Road Program and Urban Street Program. Subsidizing transit-oriented 
infrastructures, such as bus lanes, urban green space, street amenities, station plaza and facilities, 
is a priority for these programs.  
Land readjustment is hard to implement in already built-up areas because it is inadequate 
for landowners to reconsolidate their lands. A stronger incentive mechanism is developed under 
“Urban Redevelopment Law”. Under the new law, the national government uses national general 
funds to pay for one third of the cost of site survey, land assembly, and open space foundation, 
and uses Roadway special funds to pay for half of the cost of public infrastructure (Suzuki et al., 
2015). 
Urban redevelopment law should only be used after the land readjustment policy. The 
original owners and tenants are entitled to keep the property rights of floor spaces in new 




property rights to speed up the redevelopment project. The surplus floor area is sold to new 
property owners to partly cover the costs of land assembly and public facilities within the 
redevelopment districts.  
4.1.1. Case Study: Joint Development in Tokyo 
Japan’s Jointed Development (JD) considers the urban rail transit and real estate 
development or other related activities as a whole project so that it can maximize the overall 
benefits of developing rail transit and real estate at the same time: “Participating parties such as 
rail transit companies, real estate companies and other economic entities can flexibly combine in 
various ways to jointly carry the construction and development, and share the risk and benefit of 
the joint development, with the authority and guidance of city government authority” (Sun et al., 
2017).  
Because rail fares in Japan are regulated by the government to keep them at affordable 
levels, private rail companies have found it is necessary to expand rail transit development with 
other business to remain profitable. Japanese rail transit companies then developed into rail-
based conglomerates, with rail transit at the core, and real estate, tourism, hotel facilities, 
shopping centers and other retail services as ancillary businesses.  
Therefore, compared to Chinese urban rail PPP models, Japan’s PPP is market-oriented. 
It incorporates various functions into one enterprise which significantly reduces the institutional 
cost and shortens the implementation procedure (Sheng, Rong, & Song, 2011). This new kind of 
development allows Japan’s private rail companies to successfully cross-subsidize low-profit 
railway operations from other types of businesses along the rail corridor (Chang, 2017).  
 The strategy has proven highly prosperous with success encouraging further 




most acclaimed joint development case in Japan. Tokyu Corporation is the core enterprise who 
owns the line in this project that not only obtained the property rights of the land, but also the 
planning and development rights from the local community (Sheng, Rong, & Song, 2011).  
 Den-en-toshi line has two kinds of development model as illustrated in Fig. 4-1. One is at 
station-level and the other one is at corridor-level. Station-level joint development is 
implemented in densely populated urban areas where developments directly links to the stations. 
Corridor level development is implemented in areas around commuter rail stations or intercity 
train stations. It often covers much larger spatial area, with property development focusing on 
large, mixed-use communities or even a large development like new towns.  
 
Figure 4-1. Station-level and corridor-level joint development models. 
           Created by the author. 
 
 Tokyu Coporation launched a garden city development concept along the den-en-toshi 
line in the 1950s. The garden city development is high-quality and self-sufficient and supports a 




schools, medical facilities, public services branches, hotels, and recreational facilities, etc (World 
Bank, 2018).  
In Tokyu Corporation’s development case, land readjustment has been one of the most 
significant instruments used by the private railway company to channel the earnings from land 
value capture to finance rail construction and operation, and transit-oriented developments. It is 
done in close cooperation with the planning authority for which holds the power to decide the 
locations for future stations. Through the land readjustment scheme, multiple landowners 
organize a cooperative body that pools their land parcels into fully serviced and regularly shaped 
residential and commercial parcels with higher property values. Tokyu Corporation plays the 
leading role in administrating such a cooperative entity. The government will convert the zoning 
codes to allow for high-rise and mixed-use buildings to capture the likely accessibility benefits 
nearby the stations and corridors (World Bank, 2018).   
In this project, Tokyu Corporation is responsible for all kinds of commitments, including 
railway construction, residential and commercial development, as well as public services and 
facilities provision. Within 25 years, the company successfully transformed a vast, hilly and 
scarcely inhabited area into a fully serviced and planned community of 5,000 hectares and nearly 
half a million residents through the development of a 22 km-rail line (Suzuki et al, 2015).  
The annual revenue proportions of real estate and services businesses for seven major 
private railway companies in Tokyo metropolitan area are presented in fig. 4-2. Real estate and 
other service businesses comprised 40.5% of Tokyu’s revenue. This number is significantly 
higher than the other private rail companies and serves to successfully reduce the company’s 
reliance on fare revenue to finance its operation and maintenance costs. The question is, how 





Fig. 4-2 Revenue share comparison of seven private rail companies in 
Tokyo, 2011 (Suzuki et al., 2015). 
 
The development of Den-en-toshi line bv Tokyu Corporation can serve as a case study to 
understand how companies can profit and self-finance rail line construction and operation 
through a LVC mechanism. In addition, Tokyu Corporation’s railway redevelopment projects 
were constructed by its subsidiary company, the Tokyu Construction Corporation, and were 
further funded by another subsidiary company, Tokyu Security, one of Japan’s largest security 
firms (Suzuki et al., 2015). In fact, the company has many subsidiary companies across its 
portfolio, including hotels, retails, real estate, etc. and is why such a large percentage of Tokyu’s 
profits are earned through non-rail business activities. These profits can also be used to cover and 




Fig. 4-3 shows the net income shares of Tokyu Corporation in 2003 and further 
emphasizes that the majority of the company’s income comes not only from fares, but also from 
real estate and residential services (i.e. non-rail services). 
 
Fig 4-3. Net Income Shares of Tokyu Corporation, 2013  
(Suzuki et al., 2015; Graphed by the author) 
 
4.2. China: The Property Law 
Unlike in Japan, land policies in China are implemented under a state leasehold system. 
Land development is usually divided into two stages. First comes the first-level development of 
land, which means to deal with the land to achieve necessary construction conditions for future 
development, and it is usually conducted by the government or with the authorization of the 
government through agreement-based allocation. The second stage is to develop properties on 
the land. The supply of land for non-public welfare use will only be realized through bidding, 




rail transit construction belongs to urban infrastructure land. According to the “Property Law 
(2007)”, “Urban Real Estate Law (1994)” and “Land Management Law (1986)”, only urban 
infrastructure and public utility land can be obtained via city authorities’ allocation; other 
development land along rail transit is classified as commercial land. The “Property Law” also 
specifies that commercial land should be acquired through tender, auction or other public bidding 
methods. 
 Therefore, rail transit companies in China can obtain the right of second-stage 
development for land along the metro line only through bidding or auction. However, due to the 
bidding system for commercial land in China, rail transit companies have to compete with 
commercial property developers, which will increase the rail transit companies’ development 
costs and significantly reduce their financing effect on urban rail development.  
4.2.1. Case Study: Predetermined Land Reserve in Wuhan  
 
Wuhan’s predetermined land reserve (PLR) LVC scheme was borrowed and adjusted 
from Japan’s JD model (Sun et al., 2017). PLR is a new LVC model for urban rail transit 
financing which attempts to link the value of reserved land parcels with rail transit projects and 
obtain benefits from predetermined land to recoup rail transit investments (Sun et al., 2017). 
As explained in section 6, property laws in mainland China specify that urban 
infrastructure and public utility land can only be obtained via city authority allocation. However, 
commercial land, as well land with two or more intended land users, should be acquired through 
tender, auction or other public bidding methods (Sun el al., 2017). In this light, in strict 
accordance with the provision of the property law, rail transit owners must publicly compete 
with commercial property developers, even though the rail transit company’s development costs 




In PLR, however, the city government entrusts the city-owned rail transit company to 
reserve and develop land parcels along rail transits in first-stage development. The company is 
responsible for financing and reserving the land. Then, a few years later after reserving is 
finished, the company will deliver the land to the Municipal Land Exchange Center or the Land 
Reserve Center to trade through auction and bidding. The income generated in this process is the 
land transfer fee, which is returned to the company after the government deducts any necessary 
taxes, land reserve costs and other transaction costs. The remaining income is then used for rail 
transit finance. Fig.4-4 illustrates the PLR implementation process. 
 







5. Comparative Analysis 
5.1 Policy Goals 
The Chinese central government made tentative efforts to introduce new policies to the 
existing institutional context to promote PPPs. These policies were intended to guide the 
development direction rather than providing specific regulations. Compared to Japan, China does 
not have a national legal basis for a comprehensive code for PPP in the urban rail sector, nor 
does it have an independent administrative institution to enable private entities to operate public 
facilities or any PPP units established within government organization as a special executive 
vehicle to facilitate PPP development process. 
For LVC policies and land policies, Japan’s policies encourage private sectors to expand 
their rail transit development with other businesses to remain profitable. Under its market 
freehold system, Japan’s Land Readjustment Law and Urban Redevelopment Law have played 
significant roles for private urban rail developers in enabling the collection of lands for 
development of urban rail and urban-rail-centered businesses. However, China’s state leasehold 
system constrains the development right and land acquisition for private rail transit 
developments. Also, because the supply of land for non-public welfare use in China can only be 
realized through bidding, auction and allocation, besides a few exceptions, private rail companies 
have to compete with commercial property developers and suffer from heavy burdens on land 
costs.  
China and Japan share similar motivations to apply PPP. Before PPP was introduced, the 
Chinese government solely provided almost all projects funds and operational services for public 
infrastructure projects. A contradiction between an urgent need for more infrastructure and 




adoption of PPP. In Japan, PPP was motivated to bring management skills and financiers from 
the private sector to public services to promote and develop urban renewal projects.  
5.2. Policy Outcomes 
The Japanese government played a significant role in facilitating land acquisition for 
railway companies. There were two main instruments used for Japan’s urban rail development 
and both are market-based (Chang, 2017). The land readjustment scheme was usually applied in 
the urban fringes. Generally, this instrument helped private developers to acquire irregular 
farmland at low prices and return the original landowners with smaller but full residential 
services and commercial land. The developer collected the surplus to cover part of the 
infrastructure costs. This instrument was more horizontal based without a significant increase in 
FAR and it empowers the urban edge with great potential to become sub-centers for the city 
(Chang, 2017). The other instrument was the urban redevelopment scheme, which was usually 
applied in already built, dense areas and allowed the government to modify zoning codes and 
increases maximum FARs in the targeted redevelopment areas, typically around rail transit 
stations (Suzuki et al., 2015). 
 Both schemes required a building consensus, which was often very time-consuming. 
Smooth implementation relied on traditional social ties and adequate economic incentives. The 
government sometimes used eminent domain to help developers to hasten land assembly, but 
careless applications could result in long-lasting social tensions and feelings of mistrust, so a 
more inclusive instrument called public involvement was created to reduce the negative impacts 
of eminent domain (Suzuki et al., 2015).  
 Japan’s JD model can be used not only along rail corridors but also in a huge-scale 




because its development cycle can last several decades. The company utilizing it is also able to 
internalize capital gains from real estate businesses and development opportunities due to 
increased accessibility and agglomeration benefits from private rail investment.  
In Wuhan’s case, the rail transit company played a subsidiary role of the Land Reserve 
Center instead of carrying out actions independently in its own name (Sun el at., 2017). The 
government decided which land could be pre-reserved for them. Conversely, in Japan’s case, the 
private rail company was able to collect land through collaboration with local landowners. In the 
latter case, the company would return a smaller area of land to the landowner but of higher value 
than the original cost. Such a scheme effectively invites more stakeholders to jointly undertake 
the risks and share the benefits. In Wuhan’s case, land transaction occurred between the 
government and the rail companies. Once the land was collected, the landowner lost the land 
since China’s land ownership was all state-owned.  
In terms of value capture, land value was increased via the government’s pre-reserve 
method in the case of Wuhan. In Japan’s JD model, land value increments were generated 
through creating densities and promoting efficient land use around stations via zoning changes 
and other benefits brought by TOD.  
Thus, this paper determines that Wuhan’s model may have issued an over-reliance of 
land financing, which will expose the government to an overheated real estate market (Suzuki, 
2015). In other words, under such a pre-reserve system, the rail company’s revenue is extremely 
sensitive to fluctuations in the amount of land being sold and changes in property values since 
the government and the rail transit company are mostly borrowing against expected future 




In terms of sustainability, Beijing Line 4’s PPP model cannot be seen as a successful 
financing tool to significantly reduce the government’s financing burden under a “hot” 
development environment for urban rail transit in China. With 51% of BMTRC’s shares held by 
public entities, the government will need to subsidize the company if any loss can be considered 
due to policy changes by the government (for example, the artificially flat fare rate of 2RMB). In 
effect, China’s URT development remains heavily funded by the government and its current 
Beijing Line 4 PPP model is inadequate and unsustainable as a means to finance China’s future 
rapid URT development.  
5.3. Lessons 
 From the perspective of institutional barriers, China’s institutional context is not 
favorable for Japan’s JD model. First, because of the bidding system for commercial land in 
China, private rail transit companies need to compete with commercial land developers, resulting 
in an extremely heavy burden in land costs. Second, under the system of public land ownership, 
China’s land is completely under the control of the government and a joint development is 
mainly led by the government, significantly restricting the private sector’s initiative and 
participation. Third, from the perspective of the current design of urban rail PPP concession 
agreement, the Chinese government has a strong political will to hold the entire ownership of the 
project after the rail project’s construction is complete; The legal basis for China’s urban rail 
PPPs is weak and immature, and there exists risks for the government to change the terms at the 
expense of the private sector. Lastly, from the perspective of the JD model itself, it is very hard 
to find a rail transit company with sufficient capacity to solely fund such a huge rail development 






China’s current policies are not inclined to benefit the private sector and legislation does 
not allow for pro-profit development above or around transit stations. Before the introduction of 
the urban rail PPP approach, the Chinese environment for urban rail infrastructure development 
was generally stable, though such stability had been accomplished by a complex and highly-
coupled set of constraints that included both formal and informal rules and a traditional urban 
rail infrastructure project development approach; Typically all funded projects and all services 
were provided by the government. Facing significant challenges in financing the rapid growth of 
urban rail infrastructures, the Chinese government has taken a relatively conservative position at 
the national level to gradually adjust the complex and highly-coupled institutional system.  
 More recently, as per the pilot phase of PPPs for general infrastructure projects in China 
(1983-1999), Chinese local governments have begun taking advantage of policies initiated by the 
central government, designing different local regulations with an expectation of attracting more 
PPPs to finance their metro projects (for example, Predetermined Land Reserve in Wuhan, 
Development Right Leases in Nanchang, R+P Model in Shenzhen, etc.).  
 By comparing Japan’s JD model, Wuhan’s PLR model and Beijing’s Line 4 model, this 
paper has revealed that urban rail PPP practice is sensitive to enabling policy environment 
provided by the government at both the local and national level. Besides institutional and legal 
barriers in China, such as different land ownership and land transfer systems as compared to 
Japan, China lacks an inadequate legal basis and an effective LVC scheme that could effectively 
invite more stakeholders to jointly undertake the risks and share the benefits. On the other hand, 
Japan’s JD model is very ambitious, with major requirements necessary to make it profitable, 




schemes and a broad range of development experience in both rail operation and real estate 
business. However, none of these requirements are easy to fulfil in China’s current development 
context. Consequently, while Japan’s JD model might be profitable and successful in revenue 
generation and community empowerment, it still cannot be directly borrowed from Japan to be 
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